From 835363f430c5dee0b53b7c415572cdfdcc02ad18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qiu Tingting Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2021 15:23:11 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Fix a spell miss of document. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Bug-AGL：SPEC-4188 Signed-off-by: Qiu Tingting Change-Id: I25be4702acb64be59b9d79cf5a46354c8302ea8e Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/c/AGL/documentation/+/27051 Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Moeller Tested-by: Jan-Simon Moeller --- docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform.md index 917404b..2112fdc 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform.md @@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ vulnerable to attack. For example, if the kernel is stopped and restarted with the *security=none* flag, then SMACK is not enabled. Furthermore, `systemd` starts the loading of **SMACK** rules during start-up. If this start-up process is interfered with, then **SMACK** will not run. Alternatively, new policies can -be added with `smackload` allowing unforseen privileges to alternative +be added with `smackload` allowing unforeseen privileges to alternative applications/executables. Another intrusion on the kernel level is to rebuild the kernel (as it is @@ -918,4 +918,4 @@ a capability. These capabilities are divided into three groups: - e: Effective: This means the capability is “activated”. - p: Permitted: This means the capability can be used/is allowed. - i: Inherited: The capability is kept by child/subprocesses upon execve() for - example. \ No newline at end of file + example. -- 2.16.6