+++ /dev/null
----
-title: Introduction
----
-
-# Part 8 - Update (**OTA**)
-
-## Abstract
-
-Updating applications and firmware is essential for the development of new
-features and even more to fix security bugs. However, if a malicious third party
-manages to alter the content during transport, it could alter the functioning of
-the system and/or applications. The security of the updates is therefore a
-critical point to evaluate in order to guarantee the integrity, the
-confidentiality and the legitimacy of the transmitted data.
-
-## Attack Vectors
-
-Updates Over The Air are one of the most common points where an attacker will
-penetrate. An OTA update mechanism is one of the highest threats in the system.
-If an attacker is able to install his own application or firmware on the system,
-he can get the same level of access that the original application or firmware
-had. From that point, the intruder can get unfettered access to the rest of the
-system, which might include making modifications, downloading other pieces of
-software, and stealing assets.
-
-### Man In The Middle (MITM)
-
-The man-in-the-middle attack is the most classic example of an attack, where an
-adversary inserts himself between two communicating entities and grabs whatever
-is being communicated. In the case of OTA attacks, the connection in the network
-may be intercepted:
-
-* On the internet, before the cloud back-end.
-* At the base station, 3G,4G,5G connection to the internet.
-* At the receiving antenna, connection to the car.
-* Between the receiving antenna and the gateway router (if present), connection
- within the car.
-* Between the gateway router and the target component (IVI, In-Vehicle
- Infotainment unit).
-
-There are many ways to mount a MITM attack. For example, proxy tools like Burp
-Proxy can be used to intercept web traffic as a man-in-the-middle. Under the
-guise of being a testing tool, the proxy server is often used in attack
-scenarios. It runs on a variety of platforms.
-
-As another example, false base station attacks are known to be fairly easy to
-set-up. The problem is apparently fairly prevalent in countries like China and
-in the UK. These fake base stations are sometimes just eavesdropping on the
-communication, but others have the potential to do serious harm.
-
-Defenses against MITM attacks include encrypted and signed data pipes.
-Furthermore, architects and developers are also recommended to encrypt and sign
-the payloads that are being passed over these pipes, to defend against perusal
-of the data.
-
-### Man At The End (MATE)
-
-The man-at-the-end attack is when an intruder analyzes the end-point of the
-communication when software is accessing the data communication. This is a more
-severe attack type where the attacker can:
-
-* Steal keys.
- * For example, a simple debugging session in running software could reveal a
- key used in memory.
-* Tamper software.
- * For example, replacing just one function call in software with a NOP (i.e.
- no operation) can drastically change the behavior of the program.
-* Jam branches of control.
- * For example, making a program take one branch of control rather than the
- intended branch can mean the difference between an authorized and a
- non-authorized installation.
-* Modify important data.
- * For example, if the data changed is a key or data leading to a control path,
- then this attack can be severe.
- * In the case of OTA updates, MATE attacks are particularly problematic for
- the system. One of the consequences of MATE attacks can be installed
- software that allows installation of any other software. For example, an
- attacker might install remote access software to control any part of the
- system.
-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-## Acronyms and Abbreviations
-
-The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
-
-Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
-------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-_FOTA_ | **F**irmware **O**ver **T**he **A**ir
-_MATE_ | **M**an **A**t **T**he **E**nd
-_MITM_ | **M**an **I**n **T**he **M**iddle
-_OTA_ | **O**ver **T**he **A**ir
-_SOTA_ | **S**oftware **O**ver **T**he **A**ir
-_TUF_ | **T**he **U**pdate **F**ramework
Code Review / AGL / documentation.git / blobdiff