docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.2_Wireless.md

   1 ---
   2 title: Wireless
   3 ---
   4
   5 # Wireless
   6
   7 In this part, we talk about possible remote attacks on a car, according to the
   8 different areas of possible attacks. For each communication channels, we
   9 describe attacks and how to prevent them with some recommendations. The main
  10 recommendation is to always follow the latest updates of these remote
  11 communication channels.
  12
  13 <!-- section-config -->
  14
  15 Domain                  | Object | Recommendations
  16 ----------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------
  17 Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Update | Always follow the latest updates of remote communication channels.
  18
  19 <!-- end-section-config -->
  20
  21 We will see the following parts:
  22
  23 - [Wifi](#wifi)
  24
  25 - [Bluetooth](#bluetooth)
  26
  27 - [Cellular](#cellular)
  28
  29 - [Radio](#radio)
  30
  31 - [NFC](#nfc)
  32
  33 <!-- section-todo -->
  34
  35 Domain                  | Improvement
  36 ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------
  37 Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Add communication channels (RFID, ZigBee?).
  38
  39 <!-- end-section-todo -->
  40
  41 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  42
  43 For existing automotive-specific means, we take examples of existing system
  44 attacks from the _IOActive_ document ([A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack
  45 Surfaces](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf))
  46 and from the ETH document ([Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start
  47 Systems in Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf)).
  48
  49 - [Telematics](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A40%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D)
  50
  51 - [Passive Anti-Theft System
  52   (PATS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A11%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C574%2C0%5D)
  53
  54 - [Tire Pressure Monitoring System
  55   (TPMS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A17%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D)
  56
  57 - [Remote Keyless Entry/Start
  58   (RKE)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A26%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D)
  59
  60 - [Passive Keyless Entry (PKE)](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf)
  61
  62 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  63
  64 <!-- pagebreak -->
  65
  66 ## Wifi
  67
  68 ### Attacks
  69
  70 We can differentiate existing attacks on wifi in two categories: Those on
  71 **WEP** and those on **WPA**.
  72
  73 - **WEP** attacks:
  74
  75   - **FMS**: (**F**luhrer, **M**antin and **S**hamir attack) is a "Stream cipher
  76     attack on the widely used RC4 stream cipher. The attack allows an attacker
  77     to recover the key in an RC4 encrypted stream from a large number of
  78     messages in that stream."
  79   - **KoreK**: "Allows the attacker to reduce the key space".
  80   - **PTW**: (**P**yshkin **T**ews **W**einmann attack).
  81   - **Chopchop**: Found by KoreK, "Weakness of the CRC32 checksum and the lack
  82     of replay protection."
  83   - **Fragmentation**
  84
  85 - **WPA** attacks:
  86
  87   - **Beck and Tews**: Exploit weakness in **TKIP**. "Allow the attacker to
  88     decrypt **ARP** packets and to inject traffic into a network, even allowing
  89     him to perform a **DoS** or an **ARP** poisoning".
  90   - [KRACK](https://github.com/kristate/krackinfo): (K)ey (R)einstallation
  91     (A)tta(ck) ([jira AGL
  92     SPEC-1017](https://jira.automotivelinux.org/browse/SPEC-1017)).
  93
  94 ### Recommendations
  95
  96 - Do not use **WEP**, **PSK** and **TKIP**.
  97
  98 - Use **WPA2** with **CCMP**.
  99
 100 - Should protect data sniffing.
 101
 102 <!-- section-config -->
 103
 104 Domain                       | Tech name or object | Recommendations
 105 ---------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 106 Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-1 | WEP, PSK, TKIP      | Disabled
 107 Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-2 | WPA2 and AES-CCMP   | Used
 108 Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-3 | WPA2                | Should protect data sniffing.
 109 Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-4 | PSK                 | Changing regularly the password.
 110 Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-5 | Device              | Upgraded easily in software or firmware to have the last security update.
 111
 112 <!-- end-section-config -->
 113
 114 See [Wifi attacks WEP WPA](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf) and
 115 [Breaking wep and wpa (Beck and
 116 Tews)](https://dl.aircrack-ng.org/breakingwepandwpa.pdf) for more information.
 117
 118 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 119
 120 <!-- pagebreak -->
 121
 122 ## Bluetooth
 123
 124 ### Attacks
 125
 126 - **Bluesnarfing** attacks involve an attacker covertly gaining access to your
 127   Bluetooth-enabled device for the purpose of retrieving information, including
 128   addresses, calendar information or even the device's **I**nternational
 129   **M**obile **E**quipment **I**dentity. With the **IMEI**, an attacker could
 130   route your incoming calls to his cell phone.
 131 - **Bluebugging** is a form of Bluetooth attack often caused by a lack of
 132   awareness. Similar to bluesnarfing, bluebugging accesses and uses all phone
 133   features but is limited by the transmitting power of class 2 Bluetooth radios,
 134   normally capping its range at 10-15 meters.
 135 - **Bluejacking** is the sending of unsolicited messages.
 136 - **BLE**: **B**luetooth **L**ow **E**nergy
 137   [attacks](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf).
 138 - **DoS**: Drain a device's battery or temporarily paralyze the phone.
 139
 140 ### Recommendations
 141
 142 - Not allowing Bluetooth pairing attempts without the driver's first manually
 143   placing the vehicle in pairing mode.
 144 - Monitoring.
 145 - Use **BLE** with caution.
 146 - For v2.1 and later devices using **S**ecure **S**imple **P**airing (**SSP**),
 147   avoid using the "Just Works" association model. The device must verify that an
 148   authenticated link key was generated during pairing.
 149
 150 <!-- section-config -->
 151
 152 Domain                            | Tech name     | Recommendations
 153 --------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------
 154 Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-1 | BLE           | Use with caution.
 155 Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-2 | Bluetooth     | Monitoring
 156 Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-3 | SSP           | Avoid using the "Just Works" association model.
 157 Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-4 | Visibility    | Configured by default as undiscoverable. Except when needed.
 158 Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-5 | Anti-scanning | Used, inter alia, to slow down brute force attacks.
 159
 160 <!-- end-section-config -->
 161
 162 See [Low energy and the automotive
 163 transformation](http://www.ti.com/lit/wp/sway008/sway008.pdf), [Gattacking
 164 Bluetooth Smart Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf), [Comprehensive
 165 Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack
 166 Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf) and [With Low
 167 Energy comes Low
 168 Security](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf)
 169 for more information.
 170
 171 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 172
 173 <!-- pagebreak -->
 174
 175 ## Cellular
 176
 177 ### Attacks
 178
 179 - **IMSI-Catcher**: Is a telephone eavesdropping device used for intercepting
 180   mobile phone traffic and tracking location data of mobile phone users.
 181   Essentially a "fake" mobile tower acting between the target mobile phone and
 182   the service provider's real towers, it is considered a man-in-the-middle
 183   (**MITM**) attack.
 184
 185 - Lack of mutual authentication (**GPRS**/**EDGE**) and encryption with
 186   **GEA0**.
 187
 188 - **Fall back** from **UMTS**/**HSPA** to **GPRS**/**EDGE** (Jamming against
 189   **UMTS**/**HSPA**).
 190
 191 - 4G **DoS** attack.
 192
 193 ### Recommendations
 194
 195 - Check antenna legitimacy.
 196
 197 <!-- section-config -->
 198
 199 Domain                           | Tech name | Recommendations
 200 -------------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------
 201 Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-1 | GPRS/EDGE | Avoid
 202 Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-2 | UMTS/HSPA | Protected against Jamming.
 203
 204 <!-- end-section-config -->
 205
 206 See [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data
 207 communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf)
 208 for more information.
 209
 210 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 211
 212 ## Radio
 213
 214 ### Attacks
 215
 216 - Interception of data with low cost material (**SDR** with hijacked DVB-T/DAB
 217   for example).
 218
 219 ### Recommendations
 220
 221 - Use the **R**adio **D**ata **S**ystem (**RDS**) only to send signals for audio
 222   output and meta concerning radio.
 223
 224 <!-- section-config -->
 225
 226 Domain                        | Tech name | Recommendations
 227 ----------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------------------------
 228 Connectivity-Wireless-Radio-1 | RDS       | Only audio output and meta concerning radio.
 229
 230 <!-- end-section-config -->
 231
 232 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 233
 234 <!-- pagebreak -->
 235
 236 ## NFC
 237
 238 ### Attacks
 239
 240 - **MITM**: Relay and replay attack.
 241
 242 ### Recommendations
 243
 244 - Should implements protection against relay and replay attacks (Tokens,
 245   etc...).
 246 - Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles.
 247 - NFC should be use encrypted link (secure channel). A standard key agreement
 248   protocol like Diffie-Hellmann based on RSA or Elliptic Curves could be applied
 249   to establish a shared secret between two devices.
 250 - Automotive NFC device should be certified by NFC forum entity: The NFC Forum
 251   Certification Mark shows that products meet global interoperability standards.
 252 - NFC Modified Miller coding is preferred over NFC Manchester coding.
 253
 254 <!-- section-config -->
 255
 256 Domain                      | Tech name | Recommendations
 257 --------------------------- | --------- | ------------------------------------------------------
 258 Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-1 | NFC       | Protected against relay and replay attacks.
 259 Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-2 | Device    | Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles.
 260
 261 <!-- end-section-config -->